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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
Judge Murphy of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
resolved defendant's post-divorce decree motion to compel release of tax
exemptions by sustaining plaintiffs objection to Commissioner Evans'
Recommendation that the motion be granted. The Utah Court of Appeals
has appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's order under Section
78-2a-3(I), Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The sole issue before this court on appeal may be simply stated: Did
the trial court err in construing the Supplemental Decree of Divorce to
require defendant to pay the difference in tax liability incurred solely as a
result of income of plaintiff s present husband in order to exercise his right
to acquire the tax exemptions for the parties' children?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Consideration of this issue does not require that any deference be
given to the trial court's ruling. It requires legal interpretation of the
provisions of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce and review of the trial
court's legal conclusions de novo for correctness. Clover v. Snowbird Ski
Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1039-1040 (Utah 1991).
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDING.
This appeal is from a final order of the Third Judicial District Court

in and for Salt Lake County, denying defendant's post-divorce decree
motion to compel plaintiff to refund payment demanded for release of tax
exemptions.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Plaintiff and defendant stipulated to a decree of divorce entered in

January of 1993. [R. 333-344]. The decree awarded plaintiff child support
in the sum of One Thousand, Three Hundred, Eighty-seven and 00/100
dollars ($1,387.00) per month, based solely upon income earned by
defendant. [R. 334]. Plaintiff was unemployed at the time the decree was
entered and remains, by choice, unemployed. She does not contribute
financially to the support of the parties' four minor daughters, the youngest
of which is 10 years of age.
Paragraph 16 of the Supplemental decree of Divorce awards
defendant the right to acquire the tax exemptions for his four daughters "by
paying to plaintiff any difference in her tax liability resulting from defendant
purchasing the right to claim said tax exemptions." [R. 341-342].
2

For the tax year 1992, plaintiff had no tax liability, with or without the
exemptions. She refused to comply with the decree and ultimately signed
over the exemptions on the morning of a hearing scheduled on defendant's
motion to compel her to do so.
In February of 1993, plaintiff remarried. For the tax year 1993,
plaintiff again refused to release the exemptions. After defendant filed a
motion to compel, she demanded and received from defendant the sum of
Three Thousand forty-four and 00/100 dollars ($3,044.00), representing the
difference in tax liability of her new husband, based solely upon his income.
[R. 360-361 ]. Defendant advised plaintiff that he was paying under protest
in order to preserve his right to the exemptions and would move the court for
an order refunding the money. [R. 360-361].
On April 13,1994, defendant filed the motion which is the subject of
this appeal, to compel plaintiff to refund the payment demanded for release
of the tax exemptions. [R. 363]
After thorough consideration, the Court Commissioner, in a carefully
reasoned memorandum decision, granted the motion to compel repayment,
stating:

3

9.
Since the Decree of Divorce was
entered in this matter the Child Support
Guidelines with respect to the award of the
children as dependents for tax purposes has been
amended and provides some further direction to
the court. Section 78-45-7.21(2) provides, "In
awarding the exemption, the court or
administrative agency shall consider: (a) as the
primary factor, the relative contribution of each
parent to the cost of raising the child; and (b)
among other factors, the relative tax benefit to
each parent."
(Emphasis added by
commissioner).
The appropriate interpretation of the
disputed language as contained in the Decree of
Divorce is as the defendant argues: that only the
tax liability of these parents is to be considered in
determining the amount, if any, defendant is to
reimburse plaintiff for the right to claim the
children as his dependents. Only if plaintiffs
present husband's income is included in
determining defendant's child support obligation
would it be fair and consistent with the intent of
the guidelines to allow the court to consider
plaintiffs husband's tax liability in the award of
the children as dependents for tax purposes.
See Minute Entry of August 16, 1994, a copy of which attached as
Addendum Exhibit 1.
Plaintiff objected to the commissioner's ruling and the Trial Judge
overruled the commissioner, denying defendant's motion to compel. A copy
of the order and a transcript of his ruling are attached to the Addendum as
4

Exhibits 2 and 3 respectively.
For the tax year 1994, plaintiff demanded from defendant the sum of
Two Thousand, Three Hundred, Forty-five and 71/100 Dollars ($2,345.71)
for the release of the exemptions, a sum based on tax liability resulting
completely from income of her present husband.

Defendant did not

purchase the exemptions and incurred additional tax liability of One
Thousand, Nine Hundred, Ninety-nine and 00/100 Dollars ($1,999.00) as a
result of being denied his right to claim the tax exemptions.
By this appeal defendant and appellant seeks (1) reversal of the denial
of his motion to compel reimbursement, (2) recovery of the total sum of Five
Thousand, Forty-three and 00/100 Dollars ($5,043.00), paid to plaintiff and
incurred by defendant in additional tax liability together with interest at
applicable legal rates and, (3) an order consistent with the Commissioner's
Ruling of August 16, 1994, that to purchase the exemptions he be required
to pay plaintiff only the tax liability resultingfromplaintiff's income, not the
income of her current husband. In the event this appeal is resolved after
April 15,1996, defendant will also seek recovery for being denied his right
to claim the exemptions for the 1995 tax year.

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's right to purchase the tax exemptions for the parties'
minor children under paragraph 16 of the decree of divorce requires only
that he pay any difference in plaintiffs tax liability which would result from
her losing the exemptions. The plain meaning of this provision of the decree
requires that the calculation of the difference in tax liability be based solely
upon income earned by plaintiff. Plaintiffs demand and requirement that
defendant pay a difference in tax liability resulting solely from income of her
present husband is completely inconsistent with the intent of the parties as
it is expressed in the plain language of the decree.
The appropriate interpretation of paragraph 16 of the decree is that
only the tax liability of the parties to the divorce decree is to be considered
in determining the amount, if any defendant must pay for the right to claim
the children as his dependents. The income of plaintiffs present husband is
completely irrelevant. Plaintiff earns no income and the income of her
present husband has not been considered in determining defendant's child
support obligation, which is based solely upon defendant's income. It would
be patently unfair and inconsistent with both the intent of the parties as
expressed in the decree and the Utah child support guidelines to consider the
6

tax liability of plaintiffs present husband in calculating what defendant must
pay in order to purchase the exemptions.
The trial court's concern that a calculation which does not consider
the income of plaintiffs present husband would be "hypothetical"
completely misses the point. Any time a non-custodial parent is awarded a
right to purchase exemptions based upon the custodial parent's difference
in tax liability, there must, by definition, be a calculation involving
potentially hypothetical tax calculations which may never actually be
incorporated into a return.
The court's order denying defendant's motion to compel
reimbursement should be reversed and plaintiff should required to return
with interest all sums defendant previously paid and incurred in additional
tax liability as a result of calculations based upon tax liability attributable
to income of plaintiff s present husband.
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ARGUMENT
IN ORDER FOR DEFENDANT TO
ACQUIRE THE TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR
HIS CHILDREN, THE DECREE OF
DIVORCE REQUIRES ONLY THAT HE
PAY THE DIFFERENCE IN THE SOLE
TAX LIABILITY OF PLAINTIFF, NOT
THE TAX LIABILITY OF HER PRESENT
HUSBAND

Paragraph 16 of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce states:
16. The defendant is awarded the right to
purchase the tax exemptions for the parties'
minor children from plaintiff. Defendant may
exercise this right by paying to plaintiff any
difference in her tax liability resulting from
defendant purchasing the right to claim said tax
exemptions.
Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Paragraph 16, P. 9. [R. 341-342].

There

is no dispute that plaintiff is unemployed by choice and that she does not
contribute financially to the parties' children. Plaintiff nonetheless contends
that this provision requires defendant to pay to her a difference in tax
liability based solely on income of her present husband in order to acquire
the exemptions. Defendant maintains that he need only pay any difference
in her tax liability, exclusive of the tax liability of her present husband.
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Courts have uniformly held that "[t]he meaning of a settlement
agreement incorporated into a divorce decree should be determined
according to the usual rules governing the construction of contracts. Kruse
vTodd. 389 S.E.2d 488,491 (Ga. 1990). See also, Sweeney v. Sweeney.
519 A.2d 1237 (Conn. App. 1987), Sutton v. Sutton. 771 S.W.2d 791 (Ark.
App. 1989). The law of contracts, in turn, dictates that such agreements
must be interpreted in a manner that is compatible with the clear intent of the
parties as manifested by the written terms of the agreement. National
Western Life Tns. Co. V. Schmek. 749 P.2d 974, 976 (Colo. App. 1987).
As this issue appears to be one of first impression for the Utah Appellate
Courts, there are no Utah cases which may be considered determinative. In
Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989), this court ruled on a
related issue, holding that state courts have authority to direct a custodial
parent to release tax exemptions to a noncustodial parent, in cases such as
this where " . . . the noncustodial parent has the higher income and provides
the majority of support. . .." Id. at 239. The same policy considerations
apply to this case.
The clear intent of the parties as manifested by the written terms of
paragraph 16 is that defendant is required to pay to plaintiff only for a
9

difference in "her" tax liability. It cannot reasonably be interpreted to
require defendant to pay a difference in tax liability of plaintiff s present
husband, incurred solely as a result of his income.
The court commissioner, after a lengthy oral argument and careful
consideration under advisement, recommended in his minute entry of August
16, 1994, that the trial court grant defendant's motion to compel
reimbursement of $3,044.49, paid by defendant under protest to plaintiff for
the release of tax exemptions. Paragraph 9 of the Commissioner's findings
on page 4 of the Minute Entry states:
Since the Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter
the Child Support Guidelines with respect to the award of the
children as dependents for tax purposes has been amended and
provides some further direction to the court. Section 78-457.21(2) provides, "In awarding the exemption, the court or
administrative agency shall consider:
(A) as the primary
factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of
raising the child: and (b) among other factors, the relative tax
benefit to each parent. (Emphasis added by commissioner)
The appropriate interpretation of the disputed language
as contained in the decree is as the defendant argues: that only
the tax liability of these parents is to be considered in
determining the amount, if any, defendant is to reimburse
plaintiff for the right to claim the children as dependents. Only
if plaintiffs present husband's income is included in
determining defendant's child support obligation would it be
fair and consistent with the intent of the guidelines to allow the
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court to consider plaintiff husband's tax liability in the award
of the children as dependents for tax purposes.
Minute Entry, Page 4. This ruling by the commissioner is sound in its
reasoning and interpretation of Utah law and the decree of divorce. It is also
supported by the same policy considerations adopted by this court in Motes.
above, favoring the allocation of tax exemptions to the parent of the children
who provides the greater support and for whom the tax benefit would be
greater.
The commissioner did not misinterpret the law or the decree as
plaintiff argued in her objection to his ruling. Her objection and the reasons
stated therein are groundless. [R. 406-407]. There is nothing in the
commissioner's ruling that "ignores the fact that plaintiff files a joint return."
[R. 407]. Nor does it "require the plaintiff to file a married/single return ."
[R. 407]. The plaintiff need only obtain a tax form and calculate what her
tax would have been based upon her individual income for the year, just as
the decree requires her to do in any event. The procedure is very simple; in
fact, while plaintiff remains unemployed, the procedure is unnecessary.
Once she signs the exemptions over to defendant as required by the decree,
she isfreeto file any appropriate tax return including a joint return with her

11

present husband. Plaintiffs claim that "[t]he only way to calculate the tax
effect of losing exemptions is to calculate the loss of the exemptions in the
context of the joint return" is simply false.
Plaintiff is unemployed by choice. She earns no income and therefore
has no tax liability. She does not contribute to the cost of raising the parties5
four minor children. She receives almost $17,000.00 per year, completely
tax free from defendant, for whom said income is taxable and not subject to
any claim for deduction. The district court's ruling that defendant must pay
the difference in her husband's tax liability essentially increases her child
support to $20,000.00 per year tax free. Under the plain meaning of the
decree and simple principles of equity and fairness, she should not be
entitled to additional compensation for the exemptions on the children by
virtue of the fact that she has married someone who earns in excess of
$75,000.00 per year and wants the exemptions so that he may save over
$3,000 in state and federal taxes. Requiring defendant to pay a difference
in tax liability resulting solely from the income of plaintiff s present husband
renders defendant's right to purchase the exemptions meaningless and has
the effect of erasing it completely from the decree, a result which contradicts
the clear intent of the parties.
12

CONCLUSION
The plain language of the decree and principles of fairness and equity
dictate that defendant not be required to pay a difference in tax liability
resulting solely from income of plaintiffs present husband in order to
purchase the tax exemptions for his children. For the reasons stated above
defendant respectfully requests that this court: (1) reverse the trial court's
denial of his motion to compel reimbursement, (2) Order plaintiff to pay to
defendant the total sum of Five Thousand, forty-three and 00/100 Dollars
($5,043.00), paid to plaintiff and incurred by defendant in additional tax
liability, together with interest at applicable legal rates and, (3) Enter an
order consistent with the Commissioner's Ruling of August 16, 1994, that
to purchase the exemptions he be required to pay plaintiff only the tax
liability resulting from plaintiffs income, not the income of her present
husband.

In addition, if this appeal is ruled upon after April 15, 1996,

defendant requests that he be awarded an additional sum representing the
amount paid to plaintiff or incurred in additional tax liability as a result of
not being able to claim the exemptions.
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DATED this

of December, 1995.
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ADDENDUM
1.

Minute Entry of Court Commissioner Dated August 16, 1994. [R.
399-405].

2.

Order of Trial Court Dated May 2, 1995. [R.599-600].

3.

Transcript of hearing on October 24, 1994. [R. 618-622].

4.

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.21.
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EXHIBIT 1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Jill Fairbanks,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Roger R. Fairbanks,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO: 914902005 DA
COMMISSIONER:
Michael S. Evans

The Commissioner having received proffers of testimony and argument from Counsel,
having taken the parties' respective requests under advisement to allow a review of the pleadings
on file and the exhibits submitted at hearing to allow a consideration of the parties respective
arguments, having reviewed the pleadings on file herein now
HNDS:
1.

Each party alleges the other party has engaged in inappropriate behavior during

the times that the children were exchanged for visitation and, given the ages of the children, an
order of "curb side" visitation appears to be in the children's best interests.
2.

The parties dispute whether defendant has substantially complied with the court's

order of visitation in accordance with the standard schedule, which identifies afriday6:00 p.m.
starting date for visitation periods. It appears to be in the children's best interests that defendant
arrive no later than 7:00 p.m. on the date set for visitation and, in the event he should fail to
do so, that plaintiff be free to make other arrangements for the children.

FAIRBANKS V. FAIRBANKS

3.

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

The Decree of Divorce specifically provides, in paragraph 4, defendant's

obligation to obtain life insurance, which life insurance defendant has failed to obtain simply
alleging that he cannot afford to do so.
4.

It appears that defendant was provided with plaintiffs request for reimbursement

regarding the children's medical bills, if not early then by way of pleadings submitted in support
of plaintiff s present morion, and it is reasonable that judgment be entered against defendant in
the amount of attomey^s-feo6 as prayed.
5.

It does not appear as though defendant has been delinquent in the payments of

child support in an amount equal to support owing for a thirty day period and within the
meaning of the statute and it is inappropriate to find such a delinquency has occurred and to
enter an order to withhold and deliver child support.
6.

The parties disagree with the interpretation of the Decree of Divorce as it relates

to the award of attorney's fees to plaintiff. The Decree of Divorce in paragraph 15 orders
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of $3,000.00 as a contribution to plaintiffs attorney's fees
and sets forth a payment schedule. The final sentence of paragraph 15, which is the disputed
language provides, wIn the event the defendant becomes more than thirty days delinquent in
payment of said obligation for attorney's fees and costs, then plaintiff shall be entitled to obtain
a judgment against defendant for the unpaid balance owing . . .M. Plaintiff argues that any
thirty day delinquency in any of the payments pursuant to schedule allows her to seek a
judgment for any unpaid balance of the original $3,000.00 award, while defendant argues that
only those payments which were due according to the schedule of payments may be reduced to

FAIRBANKS V. FAIRBANKS

PAGE THREE

MINUTE ENTRY

judgment. The Commissioner finds that the Decree is appropriately interpreted to require that
any unpaid balance owing of the $3,000.00 attorney's fees awarded at the time of a thirty day
delinquency, which has in fact occurred, is the appropriate interpretation of the Decree.
7.

The parties also dispute the language of paragraph 16 of the Decree of Divorce

regarding the right to claim the parties' minor children as dependents for tax purposes.
Paragraph 16 provides, in pertinent part, "The defendant is awarded the right to purchase the
tax exemptions for the parties1 minor children from plaintiff. Defendant may exercise this right
by paying to plaintiff any difference in her tax liability resulting from defendant purchasing the
right to claim said tax exemptions."
The parties' dispute in this regard stems from plaintiffs remarriage and her argument
that, although she remains substantially unemployed and generating minimal income for herself,
that the tax liability resulting from her present husband's income is her shared liability and that
only by defendant repaying all of the additional tax liability resulting from plaintiff and her
present husband not claiming the children as their dependents are the terms of the Decree of
Divorce fulfilled. Defendant argues, conversely, that it is only any tax liability plaintiff in her
own name and as a result of her own earnings that he is required to reimburse.
8.

The child support award entered in this matter was entered pursuant to Utah's

Child Support Guidelines attributing no income to plaintiff and requiring that defendant pay one
hundred percent of the guideline amount of support.

FAIRBANKS V. FAIRBANKS
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PAGE FOUR

MINUTE ENTRY

Since the Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter the Child Support

Guidelines with respect to the award of the children as dependents for tax purposes has been
amended and provides some further direction to the court. Section 78-45-7.21(2) provides, "In
awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall consider: (a) as the primary
factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of raising the child; and (b) among
other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent." (emphasis added)
The appropriate interpretation of the disputed language as contained in the Decree of
Divorce is as the defendant argues: that only the tax liability of these parents is to be considered
in determining the amount, if any, defendant is to reimburse plaintiff for the right to claim the
children as his dependents.

Only if plaintiffs present husband's income is included in

determining defendant's child support obligation would it be fair and consistent with the intent
of the guidelines to allow the court to consider plaintiffs husband's tax liability in the award of
the children as dependent's for tax purposes.
RECOMMENDS:
1.

The parties be restrained from having any contact with one another during times

the children are exchanged for periods of visitation and that defendant arrive at plaintiffs home
at the appointed time, in no event later than 7:00 p.m. when the visitation is to commence at
6:00 p.m., and remain in his vehicle while plaintiff sends the children out, with the process to
be repeated at the end of any visitation period.

FAIRBANKS V. FAIRBANKS
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MINUTE ENTRY

In the event defendant arrives more than one hour past the scheduled time for

visitation, plaintiff be free to make other arrangements for the children.
3.

The issue of defendant's contempt for failure to obtain life insurance as ordered

in the Decree of Divorce be certified for further hearing before the assigned judge. Defendant
may purge himself of any finding of contempt in this regard by his forthwith obtaining life
insurance consistent with the Decree of Divorce.
4.

Plaintiff be awarded judgment against defendant in the sum of $755.00

representing one half of the children's uninsured medical expense. The issue of defendant's
contempt in this regard be reserved pending his future performance.
5.

Defendant be admonished to abide by the terms of the Decree of Divorce in

promptly make all payments of child support on the date due. The issue of defendant's contempt
in this regard should be reserved pending his future performance.
6.

Plaintiff be awarded judgment against defendant in the sum of $3,000.00, together

with judgment rate of interest, representing attorney's fees due, owing but unpaid pursuant to
the Decree of Divorce.
7.

Defendant's Motion to Compel Reimbursement of sums paid to plaintiff

representing reimbursement to plaintiff for her tax liability resulting from not claiming the
parties' minor children as her dependents for tax purposes be granted and plaintiff return,
forthwith, that portion of the. sums defendant previously paid which represent additional tax
liability attributable to plaintiffs present husband. In the event plaintiff herself incurred any
additional tax liability on her earnings as a result of not claiming the children as her

FAIR3ANKS V. FAIRBANKS
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MINUTE ENTRY

dependents for tax purposes, said sum should not be repaid to defendant.
8.

Each party bear their own attorney's fees and costs for this hearing.

9.

Plaintiffs Counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this recommendation.

Dated this

1y

day of August, 1994.

l

\t*A\i\tol A J A Q J A
Michael S. Evans
District Court Commissioner
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following this

I (jP day of August, 1994.

Frederick N. Green
GREEN & BERRY
Attorney for Plaintiff
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Roger R. Fairbanks
Defendant
594 West Murray Boulevard, Apt. 1-K
Murray, UT 84123
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EXHIBIT 2

GREEN & BERRY
FREDERICK N. GREEN (124 0)
SUSAN C. BRADFORD (5377)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
622 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JILL FAIRBANKS,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.

ROGER R. FAIRBANKS,

914902005DA

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
the 24th day of October, 1994, before the Honorable Judge Michael
R. Murphy, Presiding, based upon the Plaintiff's Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendation, the Plaintiff appearing in person
and through her attorney of record, and the Defendant appearing
in person and as his own attorney, the matter having been
submitted to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 and Rule 6-401 of
the Code of Judicial Administration, and the Court having granted
oral argument and considered the evidence and argument of the
parties, and good cause otherwise appearing, it is, hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff's objection to the Commissioner's

recommendation is, and is hereby, sustained.
2.

That the Defendant's Motion to Compel is denied.

3.

That in all other respects the Commissioner's

recommendation is affirmed insofar as no other portions rhereof
have been objected to.
4.

That the basis for this Order was articulated by the

Court at the time of the ruling.

The Defendant shall, as soon as

possible, obtain a transcript of the ruling at the Defendant's
expense which shall be made a part of this record and
incorporated herein by this reference.
DATED THIS 2*.ft

day of

2

ftylA/)^

, 1995.

BY THE COURT

HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to Form:

^ i A J ^J—

ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, ESQ.
Defendant Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY,
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached
ORDER upon the following parties by placing a true and correct
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq.
Defendant Pro Se
261 East 300 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
M

day of October, 2995.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

*

.ZLk.
day of October,

1995.
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Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah
My Commission Expires:
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EXHIBIT 3
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

3
4

JILL FAIRBANKS
PLAINTIFF,

5
6
7

CASE NO. 914902005

VS
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS,

JUDGE MICHAEL R. MURPHY

DEFENDANT.

8
9
10
11

REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT

12

HEARING OF OCTOBER 24, 1994
BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY

13
14
15

A P P E A R A N C E S :

16

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

FREDERICK N. GREEN

17

ATTORNEY AT LAW

18

10 EXCHANGE PLACE #622

19

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

20
21

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

PRO SE

22
23
24
25

REPORTED BY:

GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CSR

OCTOBER 24. 1994

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH.

P R O C E E D I N G S .
3I
4 I

(EXCERPT OF PROCEEDINGS CONTAINING
COURT'S RULING.)

5
6 1
7
8
9

THE COURT:

I'M PREPARED TO RULE ON THIS

AT THIS TIME.
A COUPLE OF ITEMS,JUST AS BACKGROUND.

CHILD SUPPORT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE IS PREMISED ON

10

ON THE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES AS THEY WERE

11

PRE-JULY, 1994.

12

IN THE GUIDELINE AMOUNTS,-IN PART AS A RESULT OF

13

TAKING OUT SOME —

14

DISTORTION IN THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT TO BE

15

AWARDED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ATTRIBUTING OR

16

ASSUMING THAT THE EXEMPTIONS WOULD GO TO THE

17

CUSTODIAL PARENT.

18

THE

AS OF JULY 1994, THERE WAS A CHANGE

FOR WANT OF A BETTER TERM

—

THAT WAS COMPLETELY TAKEN OUT OF ANY

19

CALCULATION OF THE GUIDELINES, AND WAS PUT IN AS A

20

SEPARATE PROVISION REQUIRING THE COURT IN EACH CASE

21

TO INDEPENDENTLY ALLOCATE THE EXEMPTIONS.

22

SO AS IT STOOD BEFORE JULY OF 94, THE

23

GUIDELINES THAT WERE APPLICABLE WERE IN FACT REDUCED

24

FOR THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE EXEMPTION GOES TO THE

25

CUSTODIAL PARENT.

THERE IS NOTHING IN THE FILE, AND I GUESS
THIS IS ALMOST LIKE NEGATIVE JUDICIAL NOTICE, BUT I
3I

DO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE THAT THERE WAS NOTHING IN

4I

THE FILE TO INDICATE THAT THERE WAS A ATTRIBUTION OR

5

ASSUMED INCOME TO THE PLAINTIFF.

6

ANY PART OF THE COMMISSIONER'S RULING, I DON'T

7

UNDERSTAND THE NEXUS AND IT DOESN'T SEEM TO ME TO BE

8

A LOGICAL PREMISE TO HIS RULING.

9

BUT IF THAT WAS

WHAT APPEARS TO BE IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE

10

IS -- WELL, LET ME ELIMINATE THIS FIRST.

THE NON-

11

PARTIES, AND THAT IS MS. EYRING'S NEW SPOUSE'S

12

INCOME, AS MR. FAIRBANS SUGGESTS, SHOULD NOT BE

13

CONSIDERED.

14

TO ME THAT MISS MISSES THE POINT.

15

POINT IS THE ARTICULATION IN THE DECREE, OR WHAT IS

16

NOW THE SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE.

17

DETERMINATION OF THE COST OF PURCHASING THE

18

EXEMPTION BASED ON WHAT WAS REFERENCED AS "HER",

19

MEANING THE PLAINTIFF'S TAX LIABILITY.

20

THE

AND THAT PREMISES THE

WELL, ONCE SHE BECOMES REMARRIED, THEN SHE

21

HAS THE ALTERNATIVE OF FILING JOINTLY OR SEPARATELY.

22

HER TAX LIABILITY IS BASED ON THE RETURN THAT SHE

23

DOES IN FACT FILE.

24

JOINTLY.

25

FOR THE TAX LIABILITY RESULTING FROM THAT RETURN.

THE CHOICE HERE WAS TO FILE

AND SHE IS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE

1

TO RESOLVE THIS CASE ON THE BASIS OF

2

HYPOTHETICAL CALCULATIONS, AND THAT IS, A

3

CALCULATION OF TAX LIABILITY IF SHE WERE MARRIED

4I

FILING SEPARATEL/, OR THE TAX LIABILITY OF HER BEING

5

SINGLE AND FILING AS HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IS EXACTLY

6

THAT, IS A HYPOTHETICAL.

7

THESE ARE REAL MATTERS, AND THEY SHOULD BE

8

DETERMINED IN THE REAL CONTEXT, AND THAT CONTEXT IS

9

MARRIED FILING JOINTLY.

AND ONLY IN THAT CONTEXT DO

10

WE APPROPRIATELY ANALYSE THE EXPRESSION, "HER TAX

11

LIABILITY," AS THAT EXPRESSION IS USED IN THE

12

DECREE.

13

FOR THAT REASON THAT PORTION OF THE

14

COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION IS OVERRULED.

15

YOU'RE TO PREPARE AN ORDER UNDER RULE 4-504 TO THAT

16

EFFECT, MR. GREEN.

17

MR. GREEN:

18 I

(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.)

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I WILL, YOUR HONOR.

AND

EXHIBIT 4

78-45-7.21. Award of tax exemption for dependent children.
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to
claim a child or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax
purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or
administrative agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a
case-by-case basis.
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall
consider:
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the
cost of raising the child; and
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent.

(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may
not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not
current in his child support obligation, in which case the court or administrative agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent.
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will
result in a tax benefit to that parent.
History: C.1953,78-45-7.21, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 118, § 22.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 118,5 23
makes the act effective on July 1,1994.

